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· PROTECTING THE FREE SPEECH 
RIGHTS OF INSURGENT 
TEACHERS' UNIONS: EVALUATING 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
EXCLUSIVE ACCESS TO SCHOOL 
COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES 
As teacher unionization increases, 1 so too do squabbles among 
rival teachers' unions.1 Debates over appropriate bargaining po-
sitions and other union-related matters spur competition among 
unions for teacher support. One means by which a union can 
gain a competitive advantage is by obtaining exclusive acc~ss to 
a school district's internal communications facilities, which nor-
mally include the internal mailing system, bulletin boards, and 
meeting facilities.8 Not surprisingly, the union serving in a 
school district as the teachers' exclusive bargaining agent 
1. Ninety-one percent of teachers are unionized. See Levine & Lewis, The Status of 
Collective Bargaining In Public Education: An Overview, 33 LAB. L.J. 177, 177 (1982). 
In 1981 the National Education Association (NEA) had a total membership of almost 
1,680,000 while the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) claimed more than 568,000 
members. See Jascourt, Labor Relations in the Decade Ahead, 10 J.L. & Eouc. 357, 360 
(1981). For a discussion of the growth of collective bargaining among teachers, see gener-
ally Gee, The Unionization of Mr. Chips: A Survey Analysis of Collective Bargaining in 
the Public Schools, 15 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 367 (1979). 
2. The following news report illustrates the current rivalry between the NEA and the 
AFT: 
Long bitter foes, the National Education Association and American Federa-
tion of Teachers square off for big representation fights this year. Probable main 
events: teachers in Dade County, Fla., Oklahoma City and St. Louis .... The 
NEA defeated the AFT in San Francisco last spring, but the smaller union vows 
to win back the right to represent the 4,342 teachers there . 
. . . Such rhetoric and the representation fights suggest any merger is off "for 
the foreseeable future," an NEA man says. 
A Wider War? The Teachers' Unions Step Up Attacks on Each Other, Wall St. J., Sept. 
22, 1981, at 1, col. 5. See also Vieira, Exclusive Representation Versus Freedom of Peti-
tion for Nonunion Public Employees - A Study in Irreconcilable Constitutional Con-
flict, DET. C.L. REv. 499, 525 (1977) ("[B]oth the NEA and the AFT consider and em-
ploy exclusive representation as a platform for organizing teachers-and, conversely, as a 
means for undermining and destroying their rivals."); Gee, supra note 1, at 380. ("Even 
though the two organizations share many common goals, they continue to be locked in a 
struggle for control of the teacher unionism movement."). 
3. See, e.g., Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 
F.2d 471, 475 n.2 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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("EBA") often negotiates for such an exclusive grant in the final 
collective bargaining agreement.• School board policies permit-
ting this exclusive access have been attacked as violative of in- · 
surgent union free speech and equal protection rights.11 
Lower courts are split on this issue. 8 Some hold that a school's 
4. See, e.g., id. at 475. 
Exclusive access necessarily limits the communicative effectiveness of insurgent un-
ions. See Michigan City Fed'n of Teachers, Local 399 v. Michigan City Area Schools, 74 
Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1110,055, at 16,178 (N.D. Ind. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 499 F.2d 
115 (7th Cir.) ("[T]hese privileges do affect the ability of [the insurgent] to communicate 
with its members and all other teachers, especially since such privileges are being ex-
tended to the opposing Union ... " and "a continuation of such treatment would do 
irreparable damage to the insurgent."). 
The motives of the incumbent and the school board were aptly summarized in Perry 
Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1297 n.41 (7th Cir. 1981), appeal 
granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 997 
(1982) ("[B]ecause of the school board's natural interest in quiet and stable labor rela-
tions, and [the EBA's] natural interest in self-perpetuation, neither was in a position to 
assess the costs and benefits of the exclusive-access rule in a disinterested manner or 
motivated to preserve the institutional interests of the minority."). 
5. See, e.g., Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981), 
appeal granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] Ass'n, 102 S. 
Ct. 997 (1982); see also Vieira, supra note 2 (citing first and fourteenth amendment vio-
lations); Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights in 
Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 1004 (1970) (merging equal protection analysis 
and labor law principles to find equal protection guarantees for insurgent union speech) 
[hereinafter cited as Note, Exclusive Recognition]; Note, The Validity of Exclusive 
Privileges in the Public Employment Sector, 49 NO'fRE DAME LAW. 1064 (1974) (reject-
ing first amendment application but finding equal protection violations in certain in-
stances) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exclusive Privileges]. 
Free speech protection for government employees has been slow in developing, but 
recent cases show that government employees do not lose constitutional protections by 
working in the public sector. See, e.g., Givhan v. Western Line Consol School Dist., 439 
U.S. 410 (1979) (barring teacher dismissals resulting from criticism of the school dis-
trict); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (not forcing non-union employ-
ees to finance the political involvement of the collective bargaining representative); City 
of Madison School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 
167 (1976) (halting prohibition on non-union speech at school board meeting). See gen-
erally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional 
Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968). 
6. Most courts have upheld the grant of exclusive access. See Connecticut State 
Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1976); Memphis 
Am. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2032 v. Board of Educ., 534 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1976); 
North County Fed'n of Teachers, Local 3724 v. North St. Francois County School Dist., 
103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2865 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Haukedahl v. School Dist. No. 108, No. 75-
C-3641, slip op. (N.D. m. May 14, 1976); Federation of Del. Teachers v. De La Warr Bd. 
of Educ., 335 F. Supp. 385 (D. Del. 1971); Local 858 of the Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. 
Schooi Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970); Clark County Classroom Teachers 
Ass'n v. Clark County School Dist., 91 Nev. 143, 532 P.2d 1032 (1975); Maryvale Educa-
tors Ass'n v. Newman, 70 A.D.2d 758,416 N.Y.S.2d 876, appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 605, 
424 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (App. Div. 1979). Two courts have ordered equal access. See Perry 
Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981), appeal granted sub nom. 
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982); Michigan 
City Fed'n of Teachers, Local 399 v. Michigan City Area Schools, 74 Lab. Cas. (CCH) I 
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internal communications facilities must be open to all competing 
unions. 7 Others find it inappropriate to liken a school mailroom 
to a facility with comparatively unrestricted access, such as a 
public park,8 and regard the EBA's special status as sufficient 
justification for exclusive access. 9 These same courts claim that 
communication alternatives for insurgent unions are adequate, 10 
and envision potential labor strife if equal access to school facili-
ties is provided. 11 
While a school's internal communications facilities are admit-
10,055 (N.D. Ind. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 499 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1974). 
In response to Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 
F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1976), legislation was passed to establish a policy of equal access in 
Connecticut. Telephone interview with Martin A. Gould, Attorney for the incumbent 
union (Jan. 27, 1982). The legislation provides that: 
All organizations seeking to represent members of the teaching profession 
shall be accorded equal treatment with respect to access to teachers, principals, 
members of the board of education, records, mail boxes and school facilities and, 
in the absence of any recognition or certification as the exclusive representative 
as provided by section 10-153b, participation in discussions with respect to sala-
ries and other conditions of employment. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d (1981). 
Some courts have ordered equal access where no union was formally given statutory 
status as the exclusive bargaining representative. See, e.g., Jefferson County Am. Fed'n 
of Teachers, Local 2143 v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 71-468-S, slip op. (N.D. 
Ala. Feb. 17, 1972) (giving four unions in a school district the same communications 
privileges to satisfy the guarantees of the equal protection clause); Dade County Class-
room Teachers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903, 907 (Fla. 1969) (finding that a state 
statute that disallows any labor union from representing a non-consenting employee or 
union implicitly requires the school district to enforce a policy of equal access). The 
lower court in Memphis Am. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2032 v. Board of Educ., 534 F.2d 
699 (6th Cir. 1976), similarly ordered equal access on this ground. See Memphis Am. 
Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2032 v. Board of Educ., No. C-74-100, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Tenn. 
Dec. 2, 1974). On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit found that the school board's policy 
of treating one union as the exclusive bargaining representative when that union had at 
least two-thirds of the teachers in the school district as members was sufficient to confer 
upon the majority the status necessary to justify the grant of the exclusive privileges. 
The opportunity for such judicial gerrymandering is becoming obsolete outside of the 
Southeast because the overwhelming majority of states now statutorily recognize some 
form of collective bargaining for public school teachers. See generally Gee, supra note 1. 
7. See Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1301 (7th Cir. 1981), 
appeal granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] Ass'n, 102 S. 
Ct. 997 (1982); Michigan City Fed'n of Teachers, Local 399 v. Michigan City Area 
Schools, 74 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11 10,055 (N.D. Ind. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 499 
F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1974). 
8. See, e.g., Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 
F.2d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 1976); see also infra note 21. 
9. See, e.g., Memphis Am. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2032 v. Board of Educ., 534 F.2d 
699, 703 (6th Cir. 1976); see also infra note 64. 
10. See, e.g., Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 
F.2d 471, 481-82 (2d Cir. 1976); see also infra note 69. 
11. See, e.g., Memphis Am. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2032 v. Board of Educ., 534 
F.2d 699, 703 (6th Cir. 1976); see also infra note 78. 
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tedly not open to the public in the sense contemplated by the 
"traditional public forum" or "limited public forum" cases,12 a 
school board's decision to discriminate on the basis of union af-
filiation is equivalent to discrimination on the basis of the 
speakers' viewpoints and calls for special justification. Analysis 
of this viewpoint discrimination and its ostensible justification 
leads to this Note's conclusion that exclusive EBA access is un-
constitutional for communications, such as union proselytizing, 
not strictly related to EBA activities. Part I examines the tradi-
tional and limited public forum doctrines designed to guarantee 
speakers a right of access to public places, and finds these theo-
ries inadequate in the school union setting. Part II explores a 
recent addition to the free speech/equal protection analysis: the 
content neutrality doctrine. This doctrine mandates that when a 
school board allows one union to express its viewpoints, a duty is 
created to provide equivalent access to all unions, absent a com-
pelling state interest. Part III reviews several justifications for 
limiting non-EBA access, and finds most of them without merit 
and none of them adequate to justify the school board's view-
point discrimination. This Note concludes that an exclusive ac-
cess policy not strictly related to EBA activities is unconstitu-
tional, and that school boards must provide equal access for 
insurgent unions. 
I. THE INADEQUACY OF THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE 
Courts are searching continually for a balanced theory that 
protects free speech rights of speakers on government-owned 
property while also protecting the government's interest in con-
trolling activities on these facilities. One such theory is the 
traditional public forum doctrine, and its related counterpart, a -
limited public forum. Both concepts are useful in cases dealing 
with conventional arenas of speech. Application in less orthodox 
forums, however, illuminates the inability of these doctrines to 
protect all speakers who deserve protection. 
12. "Public forums" are government-owned properties where would-he speakers are 
guaranteed a right of access, subject to certain limitations. For a discussion of the tradi-
tional public forum concept see infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of the more restrictive limited public forum idea see infra notes 23-38 and accompa-
nying text. 
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Once the government acquiesces to the use of publicly owned 
property as an open forum for expression, the public may come 
to expect continued acquiescence, and the government may be 
estopped from denying any person access to this public forum. 18 
These traditional public forums include "streets, sidewalks, 
parks, and other similar public places . . . historically associated 
with the exercise of First Amendment rights."H In defining simi-
lar public places the Supreme Court has been restrictive, deny-
ing such status to advertising space on public transits, 111 home 
letter boxes,18 military bases,17 and the grounds outside a jail-
house. 18 When a government facility is deemed a traditional 
public forum, only even-handed time, place, and manner regula-
tions may be enforced, and these restrictions are allowed only 
when they serve a significant governmental interest, leave open 
adequate alternative channels of communication, and remain 
neutral with regard to the content of the speech.19 
A school's internal communications facilities fail to qualify .as 
such a historically protected site. Access is restricted to official 
13. The public forum idea first arose in Hague v. C.1.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) 
(opinion of Roberts, J.), but lay dormant until Cox v. Louisiana; 379 U.S. 536,581 (1965) 
(Black, J., concurring). See Homing, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 
1969 DuKE L.J. 931; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 
SUP. CT. REv. 1. Many cases have since relied on the doctrine. See infra notes 13-18 and 
accompanying text. See generally Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facili-
ties, 65 VA. L. REv. 1287 (1979); Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 
SUP. CT. REV. 233; Comment, Access to State-Owned Communications Media - The 
Public Forum Doctrine, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1410, 1410-26 (1979). 
14. · Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 
U.S. 308, 315 (1968). 
15. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
16. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 
(1981). 
17. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); see 
also Persons for Free Speech at SAC v. United States Air Force, 675 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 
1982) (en bane). See generally Zillman & Imwinkelried, The Legacy of Greer v. Spock: 
The Public Forum Doctrine and the Principle of the Military's Political Neutrality, 65 
GEO. L.J. 773 (1977). 
18. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). The often stated justification for limiting 
the scope of the public forum doctrine was provided in Adderly: "The State, no less than 
a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the 
uses to which it is lawfully dedicated." Id. at 47. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. 
Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 133 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 
828, 836 (1976). 
19. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 
U.S. 114, 132 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 
U.S. 530, 535 (1980). 
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communication among teachers and between teachers and the 
administration. 20 Analogy to a public park is strained and inap-
propriate. 21 Failure to qualify as a traditional public forum does 
not mean, however, that the school board may indiscriminately 
choose those who may gain access and those who may not; it 
means only that full access for all speakers and all topics is not 
demanded. 22 
B. Limited Public Forum 
Certain forums, admittedly not public in the traditional sense, 
nevertheless warrant limited protection for expressive activity. 
When facilities are "created not primarily for public interchange 
but for purposes closely linked to expression,"28 a limited public 
forum may arise. So long as the expressive activity is compatible 
with the mission of the facility and not disruptive, the courts 
extend first amendment protection. 14 The Supreme Court pro-
vides such protection to schools, 111 public libraries, 28 and state 
20. See, e.g., Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1287 (7th Cir. 
1981), appeal granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] Ass'n, 
102 S. Ct. 997 (1982); Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 
538 F.2d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 1976). 
21. See Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 
471, 480 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that the internal communications facilities "are unlike a 
street, sidewalk, park, or other similar place so historically associated with the exercise of 
First Amendment rights"); North County Fed'n of Teachers, Local 3724 v. North St. 
Francois County School Dist., 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2865, 2868 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Federa-
tion of Del. Teachers v. De La Warr Bd. of Educ., 335 F. Supp. 385, 388 (D. Del. 1971); 
Local 858 of the Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069, 1075 
(holding that "those internal channels of school communication . . . are not traditionally 
of a public nature"). 
22. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-21 (1978). 
23. Id. at 690. 
24. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (protect-
ing student right to wear armband at school in silent protest), with Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (prohibiting noisy demonstration outside of school). 
A vocal minority of the Court has attempted to extend this flexible compatibility test 
to all access claims to government-owned property where expressive activity is not cus-
tomarily heard. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic 
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 136-37 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 149-
50 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 312 (1974) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 859-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
see also Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First 
Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117 (i975); Note, The Public Forum in Nontraditional 
Areas - Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 51 WASH. L. REv. 142 (1975). 
25. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981) (state university facilities); Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (high school classroom). 
26. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
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fairs.17 Lower courts have gone further and included airport ter-
minals, 18 welfare office waiting rooms, 19 courthouse buildings 
and grounds, 80 state houses, 81 and port authority terminals81 
under the umbrella of the limited public forum concept. 
Several restrictions are placed on access to a limited public 
forum that are not placed on access to the traditional public f o-
rum. For instance, only those areas of the government-owned fa-
cility used to further the mission of the facility are considered 
open. 88 Thus, private employee areas not part of the mainstream 
of the facility's expressive arenas receive no special speech pro-
tection." In addition, only speech related to the mission of the 
forum warrants judicial protection in a limited public forum. 81 
Consequently, non-students acting outside of educational roles 
will not receive the stringent safeguards normally provided stu-
dents and school speakers.88 Finally, the manner of the speech 
must not be "basically incompatible with the normal activity" of 
the forum. 87 Noisy demonstrations thus fall outside the courts' 
protection while the right to silent protest is preserved. 88 
While certain school areas may receive the protection of the 
limited public forum doctrine, the internal communications fa-
cilities would not seem to so qualify. The employee-only 
mailroom can hardly be likened to a classroom, and any further-. 
27. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 298 
(1981). 
28. See, e.g., International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness of Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 
F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979); Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). 
29. New York City Unemployed and Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 677 F.2d 232 (2d 
Cir. 1982); Albany Welfare Rights Org. v: Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 838 (1974). 
30. Grace v. Burger, 665 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
31. Reilly v. Noel, 384 F. Supp. 741 (D.R.I. 1974). 
32. Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 
(1968); Moskowitz v. Cullman, 432 F. Supp. 1263 (D.N.J. 1977). 
33. See Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 273 n.5 (1981). 
34. See, e.g., New York City Unemployed and Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 677 F.2d 
232 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that outside groups could be limited to the waiting room area 
of a welfare office to avoid disruption); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 627 (5th Cir. 
1981) (holding that employee-only areas in airport terminals are private). 
35. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 26~, 273 n.5 (1981). 
36. Id. 
37. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (prohibiting noisy demon-
stration outside of school); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 278 (1981) (grant-
ing equal access to student groups to use school facilities because that would not disrupt 
the school's mission); New York City Unemployed and Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 677 
F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding in part that to avoid overcrowding of a welfare office the 
government could require outside groups to schedule in advance for literature 
distribution). 
38. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). 
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ance of the school's educational mission therein must be consid-
ered a secondary result. Indeed, the subject matter of the com-
munications is employment-related, not part of the exchange of 
ideas considered central to an educational facility. 39 
II. CONTENT NEUTRALITY AND THE "CREATED" LIMITED PUBLIC 
FORUM 
The traditional public forum and limited public forum doc-
trines provide protection for expressive activity in relatively con-
ventional settings. Outside such areas, however, courts have un-
til recently been reluctant to halt governmental exclusion of all 
would-be speakers from a facility. This reluctance stems from 
the public forum doctrine's focus on the nature of the physical 
area, not the content of the speech. In contrast, the relatively 
new "content neutrality" principle focuses more on the sub-
stance of speech excluded from a facility. Under this principle, 
when the government exercises discriminatory access to a facil-
ity based on a speaker's viewpoint, it violates the first amend-
ment's central proscription against government censorship.40 By 
not opening the forum to speakers with opposing viewpoints the 
government willfully distorts the "marketplace of ideas. "0 The 
39. But see Brief of Appellant at 20, Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 
1286 (7th Cir. 1981), appeal granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tion [sic] Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982) (arguing that the teachers' group is not a labor 
union, but rather a group concerned primarily with the quality of educational instruction 
in the schools). 
40. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 50 U.S.L.W. 4831, 4838 (U.S. June 25, 1982) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (a "generally applica-
ble First Amendment rule[ ] . . . is the central proscription of content-based regulations 
of speech"); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 553 (1981) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting in part) ("The essential concern embodied in the First Amendment is that 
government not impose its viewpoint on the public or select the topics on which public 
debate is permissible."). 
The content neutrality doctrine has both first and fourteenth amendment underpin-
nings. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 463 (1980) (equal protection; dictum sug-
gests first amendment as well); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (equal 
protection; dictum suggests first amendment as well); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San 
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) (plurality opinion) (first and fourteenth amendments); 
Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) 
(first and fourteenth amendments); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 453 U.S. 765, 
784-85 (1978) (first amendment); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 
(1975) (first amendment); see also Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. 
REv. 537, 560-63 (1982) (arguing that the doctrine can rely only on the first amendment); 
Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1482, 1492-97 (1970) (dis-
cussing the first amendment-equal protection merger). 
41. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public· Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 
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following sections apply this content neutrality principle to a 
school board's exclusive access policy. 
A. The Content Neutrality Principle 
The content neutrality doctrine has recently become one of 
the principal judicial tools for protecting free speech.41 Under 
this doctrine, when the government limits the access of some -
but not all - speakers, the limitation will be scrutinized for its 
even-handedness.43 If the prohibition is unrelated to the poten-
537-38 (1980) ("If the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open, governments 
must not be allowed to choose 'which issues are worth discussing or debating.'") (quot-
ing Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 
453 U.S. 765, 791 (1978) (the first amendment is "plainly offended [in giving) one side of 
a debatable question an advantage in expressing its views to the people"); Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ulti-
mately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be 
by the Government itself or a private licensee."); see also Stone, Restrictions of Speech 
Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 81, 100-04 (1978). 
There have been many criticisms of the marketplace of ideas rationale for the protec-
tin of free speech. See, e.g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 
25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964, 974-81 (1978); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. 
REv. 591, 616-19 (1982); Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 129-31 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Redish, Content Distinction). 
Still, much revisionist theory supports the content neutrality principle. See, e.g., Blasi, 
The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FouND. REsEARcH J. 521 
(arguing that expressive activity should be protected whenever it would serve as a check 
on the abuse of governmental power). 
42. Some have argued that the doctrine should be the primary focus for the protec-
tion of free speech. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (defining the content neutrality principle as "the basic meaning of the constitu-
tional protection of free speech"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 776 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (terming the con-
tent neutrality principle "the cardinal principle of the First Amendment"); see also 
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20 
(1976). But see Redish, Content Distinction, supra note 41 (arguing that the principle 
may limit free expression). 
43. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 50 U.S.L.W. 4831, 4838 (U.S. June 25, 1982) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[C)ertain forms of 
state discrimination between ideas are improper .... [T)he State may not act to deny 
access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that idea for partisan or 
political reasons."). See generally Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amend-
ment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980); Kant, supra note 42; Schauer, Cate-
gories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 V AND. L. RBv. 265 (1981); 
Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. RBv. 203 (1982); 
Stone, supra note 41. 
Licensing cases also provide support for the content neutrality principle. See, e.g., 
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-53 (1969) (holding unconstitu-
tional the discriminatory licensing of pickets and parades); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 
U.S. 67 (1953) (holding unconstitutional a licensing policy that discriminates against cer-
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tial speaker's message, but is designed to regulate the manner of 
presentation, it will be upheld as content neutral, subject only to 
a simple balancing test.44 Thus, a ban on loudspeakers in a resi-
dential area affects all speakers on all subjects, and is considered 
content neutral; conduct, not content, is at issue."' Moreover, 
even if a ban in a non-public forum bars all speakers on a spe-
cific subject matter, the limitatipn may be upheld if the govern-
ment can provide a legitimate reason for such action.46 A ban on 
all political speakers at a military base, for instance, can be jus-
tified by showing merely a rational basis for its enactment. 47 If 
the ban extends only to certain speakers, however, and other 
speakers with different viewpoints are allowed to speak, the lim-
itation is assumed to be content-based and invalid absent a com-
pelling state interest supporting the prohibition.48 
The viewpoint neutrality principle has been applied to protect 
tain religious groups). 
44. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 
U.S. 114 (1981) (upholding a prohibition on inserting unstamped "mailable" mail in 
home letter boxes as reasonably furthering the goals of protecting mail revenues and 
ensuring efficient deliveries); see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 
490, 502 (1981) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he government has legitimate interests in con-
trolling the noncommunicative aspects of the medium .... "). 
45. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
46. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) 
(upholding a prison prohibition on union solicitation and organizational activities while 
granting other groups communicative channels); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 
U.S. 298 (1974) (permitting a city to prohibit only political advertisements on public 
transits); see also City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 n.8 (stating that a ban on all employee speakers at 
an open school board meeting would be permissible); Farber, supra note 43. But see 
Stone, supra note 41 (arguing that subject matter restrictions should be given the same 
scrutiny as viewpoint restrictions). 
A common rationale for restricting speech in these non-public facilities is that to fur-
ther the mission of the facility, the government has an affirmative right to control ex-
pressive activity on the facility. See generally Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. 
L. REV. 565 (1980); Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 Sw. U.L. REv. 237, 
244-45 (1978); Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Ex-
pression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REv. 863 (1979). The most recent issue 
involving government speech is the power of a local school board to remove books from 
its library. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 50 U.S.L.W. 4831 (U.S. June 25, 1982). 
47. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (allowing a military base to ban political 
speakers while permitting access to other speakers, thus preserving military discipline 
and the appearance of political neutrality; see also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) 
(upholding a military regulation requiring service members to obtain prior approval for 
circulating petitions on military bases; Persons for Free Speech at SAC v. United States 
Air Force, 675 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1982) (en bane) (holding that a military base has a 
legitimate reason in excluding a group protesting the arms race from its open house be-
cause it is designed to foster good relations between the military and the community). 
48. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. See generally Stephan, supra note 
43. 
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private speakers over whom the government has control,411 
would-be speakers in places defined as public forums,00 and ex-
pressive activity in government facilities not considered public 
forums. ai An example of this latter case arises when a school 
board allows union representatives to speak on a collective bar-
gaining issue at a school board meeting, but bars non-union 
speakers seeking to speak on the same issue. a1 
Use of the viewpoint neutrality principle leads to the conclu-
sion that insurgents should have access to a school district's in-
ternal communications facilities where the school board exer-
cises viewpoint discrimination by granting one group exclusive 
access to a non-public forum. aa The means by which the judici-
ary often invalidates such regulations which discriminate against 
49. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 
U.S. 530 (1980) (invalidating the commission's prohibition on the utility's practice of 
including monthly billing inserts on controversial political matters); First Nat'l Bank of 
Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down a statute which prohibits corpora-
tions from making expenditures to publicize views on political matters); Taxation with 
Representation of Washington v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en bane) (invali-
dating an IRC provision which allows tax-deductible contributions to lobbying organiza-
tions only if their lobbying was not a substantial part of their activities). 
50. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (invalidating 
a city ordinance which restricts some types of billboard messages while favoring tempo-
rary political campaign and on-site commercial signs); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 
(1980) (striking down a state statute prohibiting all but peaceful labor picketing in resi-
dential areas); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (invalidating a city 
ordinance banning only films containing nudity from being shown in drive-in theaters); 
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (holding unlawful a city ordinance prohibiting 
all but labor picketing on streets near schools); Dallas Ass'n of Community Orgs. for 
Reform v. Dallas County Hospital Dist., 670 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding in part 
that the discriminatory application of a ban on solicitation in a public hospital unfairly 
affects one group). 
51. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 274 (1981) (finding improper a state 
university ban on religious student group meetings in university facilities when other 
student groups were allowed access to these. facilities); City of Madison Joint School 
Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (holding 
invalid a ban on non-union employee speech at an open school board meeting when 
union representatives were allowed to speak); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 
420 U.S. 546 (1975) (forbidding a city from excluding a production containing nudity 
from a municipal theater while permitting access to other productions not containing 
nudity); National Black United Fund, Inc. v. Devine, 667 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(holding in part that government denial of access to a charity group at a federally spon-
sored charity drive held at federal workplaces discriminates against the speech of that 
group); Jaffe v. Alexis, 659 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that a state department of 
motor vehicles discriminates against the speech of a religious group by denying it access 
to state property); Jenness v. Forbes, 351 F. Supp. 88 (D.R.I. 1972) (holding that the 
military cannot discriminate among political parties in access to a base). 
52. See City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976). 
53. See Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1981), 
appeal granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] Ass'n, 102 S. 
Ct. 997 (1982); see also Vieira, supra note 2, at 529-30. 
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speakers' viewpoints is examined in the following section. 
B. The "Created" Limited Public Forum and EBA Exclusive 
Access 
Unable to completely jettison conventional public forum con-
cepts, many courts have coupled the content neutrality principle 
with a continued emphasis on "public" arenas for speech. 114 
Thus, where historically closed government property is the site 
of a one-sided presentation, many cases suggest that the arena 
"becomes public" for the limited purpose of balancing the views 
presented. 1111 This approach is fictional and unnecessary;16 the 
54. See Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1981), 
appeal granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] Ass'n, 102 S. 
Ct. 997 (1982) (explaining past judicial construction of the public forum doctrine so that 
the doctrine mistakenly incorporated the content neutrality principle). 
55. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 278 n.20 (1981) (certain facilities to 
which only some student groups were given access became "a public forum created by 
the university itselr"); City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employ• 
ment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976) (noting that by maintaining a policy of 
differential access to an open school board meeting "the State has opened a forum for 
direct citizen involvement"); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 319 (1974) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (by its differential access policy for advertisements "the city 
has voluntarily opened its rapid transit system as a [public) forum for communication"); 
Bonner-Lyons v. School Comm., 480 F.2d 442, 444 (1st Cir. 1973) (referring to a bussing 
group's desire for equal access in the use of the internal mailing system, the court noted: 
"[O]nce a forum is opened for the expression of views, regardless of how unusual the 
forum, under the dual mandate of the first amendment and the equal protection clause 
neither the government nor any private censor may pick and choose between those views 
which may or may not be expressed."); University of Mo. v. Dalton, 456 F. Supp. 985, 
997 (W.D. Mo. 1976) ("while the University has no obligation to provide the use of its 
facilities to faculty organizations, once it does so, it cannot refuse to grant such facilities 
to one faculty organization in particular" based on their advocacy of collective bargain-
ing); Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1978) (holding that the city 
had created a public forum by its differential access policy of mentioning only some 
groups in its guide of city services and organizations). 
Equal access problems often arise when a school board deviates from an open door 
policy for use of school meeting facilities and denies access to an outside group because it 
disagrees with the group's viewpoints on social issues. See, e.g., Knights of KKK v. East 
Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 578 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1978); National Socialist White 
People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973); Hennessey v. Independent 
School Dist. No. 4, 552 P.2d 1141 (Okla. 1976); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School 
Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885, 892 (1946) (according to Traynor, J.: "It is true that 
the state need not open the doors of a school building as a forum and may at any time 
choose to close them. Once it opens the doors, however, it cannot demand [that speakers 
conform to its dictates]."). 
56. Three circuits have recently recognized that the content neutrality doctrine and 
the public forum doctrines are completely independent safeguards of free speech. See 
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1981), appeal 
granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 997 
(1982); Jaffe v. Alexis, 659 F.2d 1018, 1020 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981); National Black United 
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first amendment's concern over governmental distortion of the 
marketplace of ideas should prevail regardless of where such dis-
tortion takes place. Nevertheless, this fiction has appeal to those 
courts unwilling to make a major break with the public forum 
orientation. For example, in Widmar u. Vincent, 117 the Supreme 
Court held that a state university which allowed some student 
groups to meet in previously closed facilities must provide access 
to all non-disruptive student groups.118 The Court decided that 
the facilities had been turned into a limited public forum for the 
expressive activity of student groups.11!' 
The plight of the non-EBA insurgent union is similar to that 
of the barred student group in Widmar; it seeks access to a his-
torically closed forum open only to the incumbent. Without such 
access the insurgent is unable to compete effectively in the mar-
ketplace of ideas concerning union representation of teachers' 
· interests. By providing the incumbent EBA with access to a 
highly efficient internal mailing system, and denying the insur-
gent comparable access to this facility, the government willfully 
distorts the marketplace.8° Courts should therefore grant insur-
gents equal access through the content neutrality principle, re-
gardless of whether they use the created limited public forum 
fiction, unless the school board has sufficient reasons for enforc-
ing such a policy. 
Ill STATE INTERESTS AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Courts applying the content neutrality principle to test the 
validity of a differential access policy which creates viewpoint 
restrictions have used a compelling state interest standard. 81 
Fund, Inc. v. Devine, 667 F.2d 173, 178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The doctrines are viewed as 
independent safeguards because the public forum cases focus on the government's ability 
to deny access to a facility irrespective of the speaker's message. In contrast, the content 
neutrality doctrine assesses how similarly situated speakers are treated wherever they 
may be speaking. Consequently, the government may deny access to all would-be speak-
ers in a public facility that is not a public forum, but cannot allow only one speaker to 
present a viewpoint while other speakers are excluded. 
57. 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981). 
58. Id. at 278. 
59. Id. at 273. 
60. What little equality of access may be provided by the school district is usually 
limited to the period just before EBA elections and then only for the purpose of the 
election. See, e.g., Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1288 n.2 (7th 
Cir. 1981), appeal granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] 
Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1981). 
61. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
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This standard can be lowered either when the favored speaker 
has special status, or where excluded speakers have adequate al-
ternative means of communication. After determining the ap-
propriate standard of review for the school board's exclusive ac-
cess policy, the sufficiency of the asserted state interest in 
maintaining the exclusive access policy, ensuring labor peace, is 
assessed. 
A. Differential Status and EBA-Related Presentations 
Where two or more competing speakers have equal status, 
government discrimination against one speaker is unconstitu-
tional: the government is presumably censoring some viewpoint 
and thus breaching the content neutrality doctrine.•• The gov-
ernment may overcome this presumption, however, by showing 
that some status distinction between speakers justifies differen-
tial access to the normally closed forum. 88 School boards argue 
that the EBA status of the incumbent union provides a status 
distinction justifying exclusive access.84 This argument is per-
suasive, but only to the extent that exclusive access is strictly 
related to EBA activities. Even then, the school board is subject 
to a balancing test between its interest in limiting access and the 
insurgent union's interest in gaining access.811 For instance, infor-
mation pertaining to the progress of collective bargaining negoti-
ations, or the outcome of grievance hearings, is most efficiently 
disseminated through the single voice directly involved in those 
proceedings. 
62. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
63. The underlying constitutional doctrine supporting this principle is the equal pro-
tection clause: the government can treat different classes in different ways if it has a 
legitimate reason for so acting. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353-57 (1979); 
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 440 U.S. 93 (1976). This principle is implicit 
in the lower standard of review given to subject matter restrictions where government 
speech is involved. See supra note 46. 
64. See Memphis Am. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2032 v. Board of Educ., 534 F.2d 699, 
703 (6th Cir. 1976) ("[T]he special privileges accorded to [the incumbent] were based 
solely upon its status as a majority representative."); Local 858, Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. 
School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069, 1077 (D. Colo. 1970) (status distinction justifies 
incumbent privileges); Maryvale Educators Ass'n v. Newman, 70 A.D.2d 758, 416 
N.Y.S.2d 876, 878, appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 605, 424 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1979) ("(T]he rea-
son why petitioner was denied equal access ... was [the incumbent union's] status u 
exclusive bargaining representative."). 
65. See Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 
471, 483 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that exclusive privileges are permissible if related to EBA 
duties, but not acceptable if they are used to entrench the majority union). See generally 
Note, Exclusive Recognition, supra note 5; Note, Exclusive Privileges, supra note 5. 
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The special status of the EBA attaches to a limited range of 
topics, but often the school board places no real limit on incum-
bent speech relating to non-EBA topics.66 The incumbent is al-
lowed to speak not only in its EBA role, but also in its capacity 
as a union67 while other unions - indistinguishable with respect 
to this non-EBA-related speech - are denied an equal opportu-
nity to present their views. To protect these insurgents' rights, 
only that speech within the exclusive competence of the incum-
bent union as EBA should justify exclusive access. 88 Proof that 
speech outside this range receives privileged access should trig-
ger a finding of unconstitutional speech discrimination and re-
. quire the school board to demonstrate a compelling state inter-
est for its policy. 
B. Alternative· Means of Communication 
An exclusive access policy may be less harmful to the free 
speech rights of an excluded speaker if feasible alternative meth-
ods of communication are available which render the govern-
ment's channel unnecessary.69 It seems unfair, however, to ex-
66. See, e.g., Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1300 (7th Cir. 
1981), appeal granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] Ass'n, 
102 S. Ct. 997 (1982) ("The acceaa policy presently in force is ... overinclusive, because 
the collective bargaining agreement does not limit [the EBA]'s use of the mail system to 
messages related to its special legal duties .... "). 
67. See Vieira, supra note 2, at 522-23 ("[W)hen NEA or AFT locals distribute union 
broadsides, newsletters, newspapers, or other materials which report on collective bar-
gaining activities ... [they] also devote space to attacks on rival unions or nonunion 
employees."). 
68. If the eii:clusive privilege is limited officially only to EBA-related speech, difficulty 
remains in distinguishing incumbent speech related only to EBA responsibilities from 
incumbent speech related to union matters. See, e.g., Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. 
Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1300 (7th Cir. 1981), appeal granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n 
v. Perry Local Education [sic] Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982) ("(l)t might be difficult--
both in practice and in principle-effectively to separate 'necessary' communications 
from propaganda."). 
Although such lines are admittedly difficult to draw, an equal access rule goes too far, 
and ignores the legitimate status distinction attached to EBA discussion of exclusive 
bargaining topics. A more realistic way of ensuring an expansive right for insurgent ac-
cess is to put the burden of proof that some topic falls "within the .exclusive competence 
of the EBA" on the incumbent union or protesting school board, thus guaranteeing that 
any uncertainties are resolved in the insurgent's union favor. 
69. This argument has been accepted by many courts deciding the equal access issue. 
See, e.g., Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471, 
481-82 (2d Cir. 1976); North County Fed'n of Teachers, Local 3724 v. North St. Francois 
County School Dist., 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2865, 2868 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Haukedahl v. 
School Dist. No. 108, No. 75-C-3641, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 1976); Local 858, 
Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069, 1076, 1077 (D. Colo. 
1970). 
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pect insurgents to pursue alternate channels when the 
incumbent is gratuitously communicating its viewpoint with the 
aid of the government. Thus, the school board's content-based 
regulation cannot be justified solely on the availability of alter-
natives for excluded unions, 70 though available alternatives can 
lower the board's burden of proof in legitimizing its action.71 
The test for adequate alternatives was established in Linmark 
Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro.71 A town ordinance 
prohibited posting "for sale" signs on real estate, thus relegating 
sellers to newspaper ads and realtor listings. 78 The Supreme 
Court found increased cost, lower seller autonomy, and less ef-
fective media communication combined to render the alterna-
tives inadequate.7" 
School boards and incumbent unions claim that public mail, 
telephoning, hand delivery of messages during non-working 
hours, and off-hours conversations provide adequate substi-
tutes. 711 Compared with the ease and effectiveness of a school's 
internal mailing system, however, these alternatives are no more 
adequate than those in Linmark. Phoning and mailing are 
costly, and other alternatives demand more time and cause 
greater inconvenience: many teachers may not be reached as ef-
fectively and much information may be lost in the process. 78 
Moreover, teacher lists may be unavailable, thus limiting insur-
gent communications largely to those teachers already part of 
70. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,541 n.10 
(1980) ("we have consistently rejected the suggestion that a government may justify a 
content-based prohibition by showing that speakers have alternative means of expres-
sion"); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("One is not to have the exercise of 
his liberty of expresaion in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exer-
cised in some other place."). 
71. See, e.g., Perry Local Educators' Aas'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1299 (7th Cir. 
1981), appeal granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Aas'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] Aas'n, 
102 S. Ct. 997 (1982) ("The only effect of the existence of alternative channels of com-
munication is to lessen the weight of the state interest necessary to justify a restriction 
on a particular channel and only to the extent that other channels are as effective as the 
restricted channel."). 
72. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
73. Id. at 93. 
74. Id.; see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981) (plu-
rality opinion) (applying Linmark to on-site commercial and political signs). 
75. See, e.g., Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 
F.2d 471, 481-82 (2d Cir. 1976). 
76. Perry Local Educators' Aas'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1299 (7th Cir. 1981), ap-
peal granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Aas'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] Aas'n, 102 S. Ct. 
997 (1982); cf. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Aas'ns, 453 U.S. 
114, 124 (1981) (explaning that to the extent the home letter box is superior to alterna-
tives for the delivery of a civic asaociation's messages, such as placing material under 
doormats, it is superior because people expect it in their mailboxes). 
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the insurgent union. 77 It would be wholly inappropriate to allow 
a lower standard of review in the face of these inadequate 
alternatives. 
C. Preserving Labor Peace 
Another justification for the school board's exclusive access 
policy stems from fears that equal access will spark labor unrest, 
conflict, and strikes.78 It is unlikely that thes~ concerns would 
materialize, however, merely from granting equal access to insur-
gent unions. 
In meeting the compelling state interest test the school board 
has the burden of proving educational disruption from "concrete 
facts, not on mere apprehension or speculation. "79 There has 
been no evidence of insurgents breaching labor peace, however, 
once provided equal access;80 indeed, some evidence indicates 
that labor peace often accompanies equal access.81 Moreover, the 
alleged disruption must be such as to "substantially interfere 
with the opportunity of ... students to obtain an education."82 
77. Telephone interview with Lawrence M. Reuben, Attorney for the insurgent union 
in Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981), appeal granted 
sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982) 
(Jan. 29, 1982); see also Note, Exclusive Recognition, supra note 5, at 1084. 
78. Those courts finding this concern a compelling state interest include: Haukedahl 
v. School Dist. No. 108, No. 75-C-3641, slip op. at 6 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 1976); Federation 
of Del. Teachers v. De La Warr Bd. of Educ., 335 F. Supp. 385, 389-90 (D. Del. 1971); 
Locaf 858, Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069, 1076, 1077 (D. 
Colo. 1970); Clark County School Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Clark County School 
Dist., 91 Nev. 143, 532 P.2d 1032, 1033 (1975). 
Those courts finding a rational relation in furtherance of a legitimate state interest 
include: Memphis Am. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2032 v. Board of Educ., 534 F.2d 699, 
703 (6th Cir. 1976); North County Fed'n of Teachers, Local 3724 v. North St. Francois 
County School Dist., 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2865, 2868 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Maryvale Educa-
tors Ass'n v. Newman, 70 A.D.2d 758, 416 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878, appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 
605, 424 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1979). 
79. Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v: Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471, 
478 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189-91 (1972); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969); James v. Board of Educ., 461 
F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972). 
80. See Vieira, supra note 2, at 552. 
81. See Brief of Appellants at 8, 12-13, Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 
F.2d 1286, appeal granted sub nom. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Education [sic] 
Ass'n, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982); Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 11-12, Michigan City Fed'n of 
Teachers, Local 399 v. Michigan City Area Schools, 499 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1974). 
82. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 278 (1981); see Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 
189-91 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); see 
also Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968) (holding that a teacher may 
criticize the school board through a letter in the school newspaper because it had not 
"impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or ... 
614 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 15:3 
Only the disruption produced by a strike would qualify as "sub-
stantial interfere[nce]"; mere anger or verbal dispute is generally 
protected. 83 The notion that an equal access policy would cause 
a strike is fanciful. There is no inherent reason why the distribu-
tion of an insurgent union's messages to EBA and other rival 
union members is more likely to provoke antagonism between 
these rival unions than the stream of EBA messages to members 
of an insurgent union." 
CONCLUSION 
All teachers' unions in a school district must be given equal 
access to a school's internal communications facilities for 
messages relating to union activities, though not for messages 
pertaining to the duties of the exclusive bargaining agent. An 
exclusive access policy in favor of the EBA, for non-EBA-related 
messages, infringes on the free speech rights of insurgent unions. 
Although the communications facilities are not a public forum, 
an exclusive access policy discriminates unfairly against the con-
tent of insurgent speech. There is no status distinction between 
insurgents and the EBA for speech unrelated to EBA activities, 
insurgents do not have adequate alternative means of communi-
cation, and insurgents would not disturb the educational process 
by provoking strikes through their messages. Equal access · 
should be the rule. 
-Stephen E. Woodbury 
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